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Executive Summary 
 
 
This paper aims at defining a Strategic Threshold or Flash points for each strategy followed 
by the society as a whole. The paper attempts at analyzing interactions between two 
groups and the effect of change in trust on the path traversed. The paper draws analogy to 
the behavior of atoms/molecules during a chemical reaction to the influence of Information 
(positive or negative) on the trust level and the resulting shift in the general social strategy. 
A society can be considered as a collection of molecules (people) at various energy states 
(trust level) normally distributed. This implies the presence of a minority of population of 
high energy state (catalysts in case of chemical reaction OR leaders/influential people in 
case of societies) . The whole path traversed by the moderate population is influenced by 
the energy (in the form of propaganda) of these high energy particles until a majority of the 
population cross the activation energies towards higher macro state (lower trust/social 
capital). 
 
The theory may be used to analyze a variety of social interactions like the 
ethnic conflicts in Africa and some South Asian nations. The paper also lays out the role of 
leaders to soothe the conflict and bring back the society to a lower energy state (Higher 
trust/social capital). 
Keywords-  Detrimental Factor of defection, Trust Breaking Threshold Factor, Equilibrium 
Strategy, Game Theory 
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 Introduction 
 
 
In a chemical reaction particles are at a certain energy level (free energy) which is usually 
low. In order to initiate a chemical reaction, activation energy needs to be provided to the 
reactant which is usually greater than the final energy state of the compound formed. The 
new compound may exhibit different properties compared to the reactants. This is the 
analogy that has been used to study the effect of trust reduction in social interactions. The 
two parties (societies) usually start with a higher trust level (a low energy state) but 
repeated inflow of propaganda (negative information) causes the trust to decrease at each 
stage. Inspite of the decrease in trust the parties usually follow their initial strategy i.e. both 
Co-operate until the point when the detrimental effect of decreasing trust is just greater than 
the payoff for co-operate. The point is an indication of the shift in strategy for the parties- 
taking a more aggressive stand against the opponent. This point where the trust level 
reaches a threshold level may be defined as the Strategic threshold. 
 
The general tolerance level of a system/society affects 
the rate of reaction/shifting. This tolerance level may be called as the Negentropy 
(potential) of the system. This is the ability of a system/person to stay at lower energy state 
with respect to the society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Usually the social change is brought about by external forces (heating in case of chemical 
reactions OR negative information affecting the general trust level in the case of society) to 
increase the number of elements above the activation energy. 
Social strategies are at various macro levels corresponding to different trust levels and rate 
at which the threshold is reached depends on the strength of the negative information (the 
factor takes into account the initial energy state of the system). 
 
There is a tendency for the trust to regain a bit after reaching the flash points. But this 
movement would be irrespective of the new defect strategy adopted. This is because 
usually after the flash points there is an increased effort to bring order to the system hence 
the flow of negative information is restricted usually by government or others. But in 
absence of strong institutions the trust deficit escalates towards the next macrostate. 
 
 
 
 
GAME- AN ILLUSTRATION 
 
 
Consider a society where two parties (religions or casts etc.) are living and they take 
actions according to the trust they have for each other. We assume that initially they have a 
strong trust relationship and thus we define t0=1 (Trust at time period=0) where 1 
represents the highest level of trust. They can be considered as „reactants‟ in the chemical 
reaction analogy. Initially, both parties cooperate as their payoffs from cooperating with 
each other is higher (can be considered as sharing of common resources and helping each 
other in times of difficulties). Usually political parties and influential people in society are 
instrumental in changing the overall trust level of the society. 
 
Dixit [1999] in his book Games of Strategy has given the payoff diagram for 2*2 matrix in a 
game.Payoffs of the game played at time=0 are shown below: 
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where δ
-
< δ 
 
δ can be defined as “Detrimental Factor of defection” meaning the quantum of decrease in 
the payoffs if both parties refuse to cooperate.  
 
If either of the parties tends to defect (other being cooperative), their payoffs will be 
inversely proportional to the existing trust between the parties (if higher level of trust exists 
then defection will attract adverse effects). And the factor „ηt0‟ gives us indication about the 
threshold level of trust after which, party might think of defection. 
 
So for defection to occur, 
 
10*(ηt0/t) > 10, 
 
t< ηt0 
 
 
So t is the threshold trust at time=0, after which people might tend towards defection. And 
consequently the other party will also defect (because 10δ- < 10δ) and hence giving 10δ 
payoff for both the parties. This example has also been described by Wydick in his book 
“Games in Economic Development”, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
It implies that if trust is somehow broken down to the threshold level of ηt0 by propagating 
negative information given to parties against the other party, defection will occur. Defection 
can be considered as refusal of sharing resources etc. 
 
Where η is “Trust Breaking Threshold Factor” which is defined as the minimum level by 
which trust needs to be broken for the players to change their strategy from cooperation to 
defection. 
 
Value of η will depend on the initial trust and inter-relatedness of the parties. If two parties 
are linked in a very loose way their trust can be broken easily (implying high value of η). If 
value of η is low (e.g =0.1), it implies that trust of the parties needs to broken down from 1 
to 0.1 which is very huge, and will be possible only if very, very strong negative information 
is given to parties. 
 
After defection has occurred once, there will be important role of leaders (whether they try 
to soothe the conflict by filling up the gap with positive and good information to the parties 
and ask them to seek cooperation or whether they try to further break their trust by feeding 
them negative type thoughts against each parties and pursue them for further defection). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T t2*=η*t1 
r  
u  
s  
t   
  -ve info 
 t1=η*t0  
(Threshold for defection at time=0) 
 
 
+ve info  
t2#=η*t 
 
 
t0  
t=0 t=1 t=2 
 
Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So moves of both parties at time=1 depend on the type of information they come across and hence 
 
payoffs at time=1 are shown below: 
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The payoffs with the negative information are similar to the payoffs of game at time=0, 
where parties will tend to further defection if, 
 
10δ*(ηt1/t) >10δ; 
 
t<ηt1 
 
 
And hence if trust decreases further to this level, parties will end up getting further reduced 
payoff 10δ
2
, 10δ
2
 by both defecting. 
 
 
 
Whereas if leaders or political parties try to soothe out the conflict situation and pass on 
+ve information, then trust might again start developing between the parties. The factor 
(t/t1γ) implies 
 
that the tendency towards cooperation is directly proportional to the increasing trust 
between the parties and t1γ is the level of trust which needs to emerged for the party to 
consider cooperating even if the other party is defecting. So for cooperation to emerge as 
the equilibrium strategy, feeling of trust needs to be infused to such an extent such that, 
 
10δ*(t/t1γ)> 10δ 
 
t> t1γ 
 
 
Where γ is “Trust building threshold factor” which is defined as the minimum level by which 
trust needs to be amplified such that players consider playing cooperation as their 
equilibrium strategy. 
 
So we can conclude by saying that if there is a conflict/fight/defection among two parties in 
a society the situation can either be soothed by good and positive type of information 
infused by leaders so that cooperation can be emerged again or be even escalated if 
leaders for their own personal interest try to persuade the parties for further defection. 
 Handling Escalation of Social Distrust 
 
 
As seen in the game explained above, the root cause lies in the flow of biased information. 
The information flow may be through print media, TV or through direct interactions with 
certain influential people etc. The rate of reaction is dependent on to Trust Building 
threshold factor (γ), Trust breaking threshold factor (η) and Detrimental effect (δ). The 
institutions should select an optimum trust level that would be manageable. This is because 
trying to maintain a trust level =1 is very difficult if the present trust level is low. Confidence 
building measures with a trust building factor greater than trust building factor, γ, at each 
stage would result in a slow and steady buildup of trust level. 
 
The Trust breaking threshold factor is a function of the (initial state) Negentropy of the 
system and the quantum of information and also its perceived quality. With a very low initial 
energy state the trust breaking factor tends to decrease with increase in influencing power 
of the information. Hence trying to keep a strong floor on the value of Eta is instrumental for 
the harmony in the society. It should be brought about by a considerable check on the flow 
of biased information in the society. 
  
REFERENCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Dixit, Skeath And Reiley, “Games of Strategy”, Norton Publishers, June 1999 
 Wydick, ”Games in Economic Development”, Cambridge University Press, 
January,2008 
 Turocy and Stengel, ”Game Theory”, CDAM Research Report LSE-CDAM-
2001-09,October 2001 
 Allen and Morris, “Finance Applications of Game Theory”, Wharton School                           
October, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
